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Abstract Two arguments due to Russell are examined, and found to show that
the notion of causation as full determination doesn’t mesh easily with determinis-
tic global physics and the distinction between effective and ineffective strategies.
But a local notion of causation as involving a certain kind of counterfactual de-
pendence is, I argue, compatible with Russell’s conclusions. I defend it from a
resurgent form of Russell’s microphysical determinism argument by making some
mildly contentious claims about the autonomy of the events posited by the special
sciences.
1 Russell’s Arguments
Russell (1913) takes the relation of causation to be a relation of determination: c causes
e just when c determines e to occur. This relation is supposed to be asymmetric and
plausibly transitive as well. The fundamental law of causality is supposed to be that
every event has a sufficient cause, one that is guaranteed to bring that event about and
in fact did so. This intuition about the deterministic nature of causation is not a Rus-
sellian idiosyncrasy: it originates in Hume’s ‘constant conjunction’ regularity analysis
(if c and e are constantly conjoined, the appearance of c should be sufficient for the
appearance of e), even later accounts like Suppes (1970) keep the idea that individual
causes partially determine their effects, and deny that every event has a sufficient cause
to avoid the supposed ‘universal law’.
Russell thinks that this notion of causation as a determination relation between
events doesn’t appear in physics, and hence should be jettisoned from a properly sci-
entific world view. (Perhaps there might be some pragmatic sense in which causation
is useful, but there are no deep metaphysical truths about causation.)
Field (2003) identifies two arguments in Russell to this conclusion. The first rests
on the claim that the equations of microphysics are bi-deterministic. If we fix the
microphysical state s of some system R at t, that fixes the whole trajectory of R through
the space of states both before and after t.1 If all macroscopic events are constituted by
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some particular microphysical states, then fixing a particular event in the system at a
time will determine which microphysical trajectory the system is on, and hence which
events will occur and have occurred. Then any event determines both its temporal
antecedents and temporal succedents. But if c causes e in the sense of determination,
then by this argument e equally well causes c. The asymmetry of determination, and
hence the asymmetry of cause and effect is lost. There is no place in bi-deterministic
physics for the causal asymmetry.
But this argument has at least two flaws. Firstly, though it might be true that the
causal asymmetry isn’t an asymmetry of determination, it still might be a relation of
determination and an asymmetrical relation, where the asymmetry comes from some-
where else. Perhaps the asymmetry is that of entropy increase, plausibly set by unusual
low entropy initial conditions.2 Perhaps the asymmetry is temporal.
Secondly, it may still be the case that there is a macroscopic asymmetry between
causes and effects. Perhaps on a global scale, the whole state of the universe at one time
determines the whole state at every other time. However, if we restrict our attention to a
local particular event c, presumably there are many global states that can have this event
as a part. Perhaps all the global trajectories which feature this event in some state have
some further event e as a feature of a state; but perhaps not all the global trajectories
which feature e have c as a feature. So the occurrence of c determines the occurrence
of e in a way that e doesn’t determine the occurrence of c. Focussing attention on a
limited area might very well give us an asymmetry of determination between particular
events. Moreover, this local determination is exactly what the original notion of a cause
was supposed to capture.
The notion of a local event is a tricky one. Everyone takes it involve spatiotemporal
location within my nearby area. But I want something more than that. I want some-
thing like ‘epistemically local’: macroscopically describable, medium sized, readily
distinguishable from other events going on around it (so discrete). I take it to be a
feature of our commonsense causal language that effects and causes are both of this
category.
Russell’s other argument picks on this conception of local causation. Consider
some small local events c and e such that the occurrence of c determines the occurrence
of e but not vice versa. Russell’s argument is that these ‘local’ events won’t be the kind
of things we typically take to be related by cause and effect. Consider a putative causal
relationship between the firing of a gun F and the death of a victim D. These events
are clearly too particular to get into the determination relation, because F can occur
without D, if the bullet misses the victim, or if someone else intercepts the bullet, or
if the bullet explodes harmlessly in mid air. The problem with local determination is
that there is always the chance of some ‘interference’ from outside the local area at the
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time of the cause. To ensure that the cause guarantees the occurrence of the effect, we
shall have to hold the cause to be a very large event, perhaps the whole past cone of
potential causal influence on the effect. So if c really is a determinant of e, c will have
to be incredibly more complex and large than causes are typically taken to be.
To really determine e, we shall have to make sure that all possible interfering events
don’t occur, which will mean specifying the events which actually fill the location of
those potential interferers. But this will involve events being causes that are intuitively
not causes, simply by virtue of their being in a potentially causally efficacious location.
Indeed, we shall be unable to make a distinction as regards causal efficacy with respect
to these events. If we can’t distinguish a cause from an actual non-cause that might
have been a preventer, then we shall be unable to engage in goal directed activities
which depend on effectively bringing about certain states of affairs. Cartwright (1979)
emphasised this aspect of causation when she talked of effective versus ineffective
strategies.
We can put the net result of these arguments as follows. If we wish to deploy
the concept of causation to help us decide which local strategies will be effective in
bringing about our goals, then physics tells us that determination of effects by causes
can only be achieved by including putative causes that are not genuine causes. Physics
gives us a deterministic structure of the evolution of a system over time, so in physics
the notion of a cause is trivial because it counts every past event as a cause. If the
notion is redundant in physics, it is dispensable from a properly scientific account of
the world.
2 Causation as partial or default determination
But it seems to me this is exactly the wrong conclusion to draw. Physics provides us
with determination, and then trivialises the notion of causation. So we should aban-
don the quest for determination and instead look for causes which are effective yet
not foolproof at bringing about their effects. (Recall that it was the requirement of
determination that made us include all those pseudo-causes.)
One very nice scheme for capturing a relation of partial dependence between local
events is provided by the use of counterfactuals. Lewis (1973, 1979) provides a putative
analysis of causal claims in terms of certain counterfactual conditionals: roughly, c
directly causes e just in case the counterfactual ¬c 2→ ¬e (‘if it hadn’t been the case
that c, then it wouldn’t have been the case that e’) is true, and is not a backtracking
counterfactual (where a backtracking counterfactual typically has e depending on c,
but e preceding c, e.g. ‘if it had not been the case that the glass was broken, then
it wouldn’t have been the case that I had smashed it earlier.’) I am supposing that
excluding backtrackers captures one of the intuitive platitudes about causation and its
relation to time—for me, the asymmetry of actual temporal dependence supports the
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temporal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence.
I like counterfactual analyses of causation, but I’m not sure whether they are cor-
rect. What does seem to me correct is that there is some modal aspect to causation, so
that even on actualist theories of causes as mechanical productions, there is something
non-accidental about the causal relation. I am going to try and spell out how I think
this modal connexion goes.
We might worry that counterfactual determination looks like full determination of
e by c, especially in the marginal gloss. But that appearance is misleading. Ordinary
conditionals obey the following inference rule: α → β ` (α ∧ γ) → β (if α entails
β, then it entails it regardless of what else happens to be true). But counterfactuals
do not, and the way they don’t is instructive in this context. Typically, were I not to
have fired my gun, the victim wouldn’t have died. But were I not to have fired my gun
and someone else did, the victim would have died. But were I not to have fired my
gun, and someone else did, but they missed, the victim wouldn’t have died. And so on.
Additional considerations and factors can alter the counterfactual conditional. These
additional considerations are typically potential events that we didn’t consider in the
initial attribution of causal effectiveness to the antecedent event.
But there are some events which make no difference when added to the antecedent.
We don’t think that were I not to have fired, and were some alien on Pluto to have
performed some action ϕ, then the victim would have died. This true regardless of
what ϕ is. Some events, no matter what their character, are not capable of affecting
the counterfactual dependence between two other events. But had other facts about
the alien and the event of his ϕ-ing been different—had he for example been located
on Earth—then some of his possible actions ϕ could have altered the consequent—
if he had fired his laser ray for example. Again: if the alien had been located on
earth and had decided to perform some action ϕ in the near vicinity of my firing and
the victim’s being shot, then some of his possible actions ϕ could have contributed or
detracted from my action’s bringing about the victim’s death, whether or not he actually
performed one of that subclass of actions. Notice that if the alien fires his laser, he can
overdetermine the victim’s death—the victim is shot twice—yet from the point of view
of whether the victim died or not, the result is the same.
I draw three morals from this little science fiction example. First, events are the
wrong thing to be the causal relata, at least if we only consider actual events. Events
are distinct if any aspect of them is different. So the victim’s death is different if a
laser-and-bullet death than if it is a mere bullet death. In fact, the identity of the event
is quite fragile and quite sensitive to actual circumstances. Some think that we should
have a modally robust notion of event that isn’t so sensitive. I’m quite happy (for
other reasons) to think that events are modally fragile in this way. But since I think
that I would have played a part in causing a death regardless of the alien or not, I had
better take the relata of the causal relation to be something else: maybe abstract event
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types, or better still random variables. A random variable is a function from events to
numbers, where the numbers characterise certain features of the event. For example,
I could characterise a certain class of events as the relevant class of events that might
have resulted from my firing a gun, and use the random variable Death which takes
value 1 if the victim died, and 0 otherwise (and is undefined on events which aren’t
relevant—where relevant will be spelled out below).3
Second, what matters to the causal importance of an random variable is if at least
one of its possible values can alter a counterfactual in which it features. For example,
I take it that the alien’s close spatiotemporal location to my shooting is a relevant class
of events, because some of the events in that location involve him shooting a laser. That
is, for some of the events A that fall into that class, a counterfactual ¬F∧A 2→ D is
true. But for this alien to be potentially causally relevant it doesn’t matter that what he
actually did was knitted a nice cover for his laser gun.
Thirdly, suppose I am right about the causal significance of events which potentially
have causal relevance to other events, through the truth of certain counterfactuals. Then
I need to have a way of ruling out all events which have a potential counterpart which
has causal relevance. I think that this is largely a matter of contextual salience, just
as in traditional counterfactual accounts. But I also have a principled way of judging
salience.
Let me expand. Standard counterfactual accounts have the feature that, if out-
landish enough possibilities are considered, almost any robust modal counterfactual
connection between events can be disrupted. If we think that A depends on B, con-
sideration of a miraculous intervention, or time travel, can make B happen regardless
of A. So too on this counterfactual account, and in two types of case (Type I) some
events are considered irrelevant, but if one were to consider them they would have a
significant potential impact; (Type II) some events are relevant, but only very few of
their ‘values’, or ways of occurring, have any significant impact. Examples of the two
types may be: (i) the victim’s death depends on my shooting the gun at him, but not
if a bullet would have spontaneously appeared in midair with the same trajectory as if
I had shot it; (ii) the victim’s death depends on my shooting the gun at the victim, but
not if my shooting was of a fake gun. (See figure 1.)
I think that when we engage in counterfactual reasoning of this sort, what we are
doing is constructing ad hoc scientific theories of the situation in question. We make a
little model which has a few parameters, and the whole theory—the class of models—
shows how the parameters change when we alter other parameters. Which parameters
are included will depend on our judgements about the physical nature of the situation
in question, about the spatiotemporal connections (signals and the like) between the
events which instantiate the variables, and on the purposes for which the model is
3This is what Field (2003) calls a ‘fairly inexact variable’, and are essentially the same as variables as
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Figure 1: Types of variables: ordinary causal variables, such as my shooting; Non-
serious possibilities, typically not included, such as the miracle bullet; and unlikely
possibilities ruled out by the defaults, such as the alien’s firing rather than standing by.
being built. This last point is that models that support counterfactuals are often built to
explain certain events, and that explanations are typically contrastive, set up against the
context of certain fixed factors. The same claims hold of the models used by mature
scientific theories. Counterfactual reasoning depends on which logical possibilities the
model dictates we take seriously: which events are serious possibilities for us depends
on model and context.4 These are the ‘possible situations’ that the theory counsels us
to consider when we wonder what might have happened.
I take it that the difference between the type I and type II cases above is simply that
the type I cases are non-serious possibilities, and the type II cases are serious possi-
bilities that are often not contextually salient because the disturbing values are highly
unlikely. Hence my thought is that the type I claims depend on a contextual claim about
model choice, i.e. which variables to include, and type II claims depend on something
like the plausible default range of values that a variable can take. For causal prediction,
the default range of plausible values will constrain the application of the model. For
instance, we will judge unlikely values of the variables to be not causally efficacious;
though in thinking about actual past causal links, we may well discard the plausible in
favour of the actual values. But there is a choice about causal model which is made
prior to any context of application of that model to a concrete situation. The contextual
features of model selection, as opposed to model application, I am less sure what to
say about. I think that facts about actual correlation and about actual spatiotemporal
connectability between events that are phenomenologically salient will go a long way
to explaining the choice of variable. One thing to note is that the appropriate coun-
terfactuals will be perfectly objective features of a given set of variables, even if those
variables are chosen for pragmatic reasons.
Let me deploy some new terminology to summarise the 3 morals about counterfac-
tuals that I just drew. Let the situation under consideration determine a contextually
salient theory, in particular let it specify the set of random variables V that we will
use to summarise the values of the events in question. The theory will encode certain
counterfactual dependence claims, in particular, it will encode a pattern of mathemati-
cal dependence between parameter values for random variables. That is, it will give us



















Figure 2: A causal graph showing the lines of parental counterfactual dependence.
facts of the form “the value of variable Vi depends on the values of variables Vj . . . Vk.”
So, for example, the value of Death (yes or no) depends on the value of Fires (yes or
no), and also on the value of Alien (fires, sits and knits, or throws himself in the way—
so variables can be more than binary-valued). In general, however, not every variable
will depend on every other: some will be independent.
The kinds of counterfactuals we take to be true will determine exactly how the
dependency is cashed out. Call a variable V a parent of another variable U just in
case there exists some assignment of fixed values to variables in the model such that
the counterfactual “were V to have some different value v, then U would have some
different value u” comes out true, and V 6= U.5 Note that ‘grandparent’ variables are
not parents: if V only acts on U through W, then holding W fixed on some value will
prevent the change in V from percolating through to U. This counterfactual (roughly
equivalent to the notion of a direct cause in Woodward (2001)) allows us to construct
causal graphs as follows. Take all the variables in V , and put them at nodes of a graph.
For each Vi ∈ V , letP(Vi) represent its parents. For each variable Vi, draw an arrow
from each Vj ∈ P(Vi) to the node containing that variable. We will end up with a
graph something like figure 2. This is a qualitative causal structure, and the parenthood
relations are the most basic kind of counterfactual that should be considered in causal
reasoning.
This kind of structure will be quite familiar from the causal modelling framework
introduced by Judea Pearl (2000) and the team of Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines
(2000). The philosophical development I have given it here is basically that of Hitch-
cock (2001) and Woodward (2001), though I hope I have made it seem like a very
natural consequence of the types of things counterfactual analyses of causation are
committed to.6
Several things are noteworthy about this approach to a counterfactual analysis of
causation. Firstly, consider figure 2 again. On what do the values of the variables V1
5Thanks to Charles Twardy and Chris Hitchcock for help with this formulation.
6There may be an interesting connexion here with Lewis’ recent account of causation as influence
(2000). Lewis’ account requires that for c to influence e, there must be a range of relevant alterations of
c that are associated with relevant alterations of e. The concomitant variation of effect variables on cause
variables in the above account nicely captures this, as well as giving counterfactuals which give the influence
a uniform treatment within the counterfactual framework.
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and V2 depend? These values are not counterfactually dependent on anything: chang-
ing them will change the values of the variables at the other ends of the arrows. (Note
that the restriction against backtracking counterfactuals is crucial here: if it were not,
plausibly if the value of V3 were different, then the value of V1 would have had to
have been different too.) But presumably these variables depend on something else as
well—they are probably not the basic first events of the universe. To pretend we have
isolated them, we can appeal to the contextual salience of local causes. Causal expla-
nation has to stop somewhere, and if certain conditions on the parentless variables are
satisfied, we should be prepared to stop with them. The simple condition is that parent-
less nodes should not be correlated amongst themselves. (I see this as a methodological
condition on the construction of causal theories, not some a priori truth about systems
of variables.) There is one difficult case: if X is counterfactually dependent on Y, and
Y on X, neither through a backtracking counterfactual, then we should find if we can
another variable Z which is parent to both X and Y and screens off the counterfactual
dependence. (However, there are some cases where such a variable does not exist, for
example in standard explanations of the non-local correlations in Bell-type theorems
in quantum mechanics. This is perhaps best modelled by simply keeping the two-way
counterfactual dependence.)
Following naturally on from this, one can see how adding more variables can
change the parental counterfactual dependencies by interpolating further intermediate
causes, and by adding new parents. This can mean that contextual salience determines
the causes of an event. So does the comprehensiveness of the underlying theory that
supports the counterfactuals. This feature tends to support the idea that causation, as
well as explanation, is often contrastive rather than absolute—it depends on the salient
variables.7
Third thing to note: consider the counterfactual we used to evaluate the parenthood
relation. It relies on a seemingly miraculous ability to vary the value of one variable
while holding all others fixed on a certain value. This process has gone under the name
of an intervention in the literature. In the graphical models, it can be modelled by
severing the node from its parents and setting the value of the variable and other vari-
ables, effectively rendering some endogenous variable exogenous. We are supposed
to think of an intervention on X as encoded in a causal graph C that terminates in the
fixing of some value for X independent of other values of other variables not in C. This
isn’t quite right, because expanding some graph D that contains X to also contain C
would render C not perfectly efficacious in fixing X (C would no longer trump all other
causal factors). So we need to think of an intervention as a trumping causation. The
viability of the concept of an intervention depends on the possibility of modular causal
systems.8 These are systems where each variable in the system has some independent
7Hitchcock (1996).
8Hausman and Woodward (1999).
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exogenous sufficient cause. Cartwright (2002) has argued that modularity generally
fails. However, she seems to rely on the claim that actually non-modular systems are
not possibly modular, and this claim seems false if one is willing to countenance coun-
terfactual variation in the patterns of occurrence of instantiation of distinct variables.
Pearl (2000, §4.1) seems to think that interventions are to be connected with hu-
man free will and the causal ‘unconstrainedness’ of human volition. Whether or not
one goes this far, the notion of an intervention is strongly counterfactual. One might
think it was even a causal notion, and hence that the account must be circular. I think
that since the variables representing the intervention itself are typically outside the
model, the charge of circularity cannot be sustained. But perhaps if we tried to make a
global causal model, then serious difficulties will arise when trying to show how causal
interventions can be naturalistically modelled in the same framework—perhaps the dif-
ficulty will be in trying to make sense of the notion of an intervention in non-causal
terms when every event has a representative variable in the model and hence every
causal relation between events is represented.9 In any case, this way of thinking about
causal variables fits nicely with the manipulability account of causation that Woodward
has recently defended.10 But it can also be made to fit with other accounts, such as the
mechanical conserved quantity view of Dowe (2000), insofar as those accounts respect
the modal claims that here I am suggesting are constitutive of causal dependence in
general.
This will be a relation between types of events, and will apply in the single partic-
ular case only in a retrospective fashion. Once we see the actual values of the actual
variables, then we can retrodict the actual effects various potential causes had, through
the light of particular assumptions about what the natural or usual range of the exoge-
nous variables is. We make a default causal model, to use the terminology of Menzies
(unpublished), and by making a mixture of default assumptions and evidence about
actual values, we can create a restricted version of the causal model that should give us
the acceptable token causes. The tokens of events in question are something like Lewis’
versions of events: there may be a smoking event, which has many actual versions that
instantiate it.
What of the types of event? The most helpful way to view them is as coarse-
graining the space of possible events.11 They are the union of a lot of different ways of
9Perhaps something like what Pearl (2000, 350) thinks:
If you wish to include the entire universe in the model, causality disappears because inter-
ventions disappear—the manipulator and the manipulated lose their distinction.
10In particular, the manipulability account of causation gives a nice way of motivating restrictions on the
kinds of counterfactuals we consider to codify causal claims. The counterfactuals we have considered, about
the results of holding variables fixed while varying others, are naturally thought of as modelled by hypothet-
ical alterations of experimental situations. But some of these antecedent situations are very hypothetical, and
require very distant worlds to evaluate them.
11I thank Chris Hitchcock, Helen Beebee, Graham McDonald and Huw Price for suggesting this way of
viewing things to me.
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some description of an event being satisfied. There is another sense of type here, that
may also have a role: this is that any particular event may be an instance of a lot of
different coarse-grained events, so that an actual particular event e could be also coarse
event E1 and also the distinct coarse event E2.
Finally, what is the meaning of the arrows? An arrow between X and Y does not
mean simply ‘X causes Y’. Rather, it means something like ‘some values of X are
causally relevant to the values of Y’, where this causally relevant can be at times stim-
ulatory, at times inhibitory, and so on. This seems to nicely feed into a recent claim
that what is metaphysically primary is the multiplicity of causal connections, rather
than some uniform notion of causation that is supposed to apply to all cases (Hitch-
cock, 2003). Consider that some of the arrows might be purely inhibitory, some purely
contributory, some a mix of both, and what constitutes in all these cases the ground of
the counterfactual claim might be very different. Why think they can all be shoehorned
into one neat causal metaphor like the ‘cement of the universe’?
3 Determinism
Let us take stock. I think at this point we have a viable framework for talking about
counterfactual relations of dependence between convenient sets of local events. We
can see that Russell’s arguments depend in one sense on trying to give a Carnapian
explication of the causal relation in terms of relations and events that physics makes
available to us. We translate the talk of local events into talk about the global states
that constitute those events, and we translate talk of causal production into talk of
laws of succession between microstates. In one sense all I want to suggest is that this
explication of causation is a bad one. We aren’t forced to map local events onto global
states; and we aren’t forced to think that respectable science must give us invariable
laws of succession.
But we may be left with a worry that the reconstruction I’ve given doesn’t really
address the spirit of Russell’s arguments. I’ve argued that there is a certain pragmati-
cally necessary emphasis in the folk notion of causation on local events and relations of
counterfactual dependence. But in a sense I’ve evaded the original worry. I’ve shown
that if we are content to give a conceptual analysis of some element of the concept of
causation, then Russell’s claims don’t straightforwardly attach. A defender of Russell’s
arguments will respond that given some plausible theses about supervenience and the
metaphysical primacy of physics, the problem with causation is that its emphasis on
the local and the modal seems not to fit with the way we take the world really to be.
Perhaps an analogy with objective chance is helpful. Almost everyone thinks that,
if determinism is true, then all objective chances are 0 and 1. Why? Because if mi-
crostates ‘really’ constitute the actual instances of events of a probability space, and
the theory which posits them has deterministic state transitions, then fixing an event
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will fix the future progress of the system through the state space and hence through the
event space. It is at best an epistemic feature of macroscopic events that they seem to
have non-trivial chances of coming about or failing to come about. Russell might say
here that the notion of chance has no place in a scientifically respectable world view,
but we don’t need to go that far. All we need is that the place of chance in that world
view is at best redundant.
The exactly similar response I imagine being made by a defender of Russell with
regard to causation. What we’ve shown is that if we take into account some quite
natural epistemic limitations on human agents, we are forced to admit that we will be
ignorant of the microstates that really constitute the world around us. We thus have
to resort to less epistemically demanding notions in order to get on in the world. But
these epistemically less demanding notions are in fact simple but false descriptions of
the underlying world. The metaphysical resources of fundamental physics simply are
not interrelated in the way they would have to be for causal talk to even approximately
describe the underlying reality.
Indeed, the very features of causation that we’ve discussed bear this out. Causation
is context-dependent: almost everyone agrees that it is theory relative (sensitive to
included variables), and some think it is default relative also. Causation is partial and
local. If causation is expanded into a global, context-insensitive notion, then it seems
to evaporate: if it holds at all between states, then it holds trivially. And if it is not
expanded, then it is a best a poor summary of what physics does better at telling us.
At least probability can have some kind of robust existence. If Reichenbachian
frequentists are right, then one has chances everywhere one has a sequence of outcomes
that can be partitioned and whose frequencies converge.12 Chance then is merely a
summary of what physics can tell us in a more detailed way. But causation is not just
epistemically more convenient, it is a false idealisation from the facts.
The really curious part is how all this connects up with determinism, the notion that
causation was originally supposed to go hand in glove with. We have now the curious
situation that non-trivial causation and determinism are at odds. Suppes (1970) argued
that causation re-appeared in fundamental science just when probabilistic indetermin-
ism at the microlevel became apparent. If there is no further fact that fixes the value
of some variable X, then different values that X could take in some future evolution of
the system will make a difference to further later characteristics of the evolution of the
system. But if determinism is true, then there is always some further fact that fixes the
actual value of any variable on every actual event once some set of occurrent events is
fixed. X can’t take different values, hence can’t make a difference. Of course, if it had
been different, then everything would have been different. There is no sense in hold-
ing some things fixed and letting other things vary if the determination relation holds
12von Mises’ requirement of objective randomness does pose a problem for deterministic chances, but
Reichenbach imposes no such constraint.
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between whole states.
Can we escape this argument? I’d like to try and sketch a few ways to make a
response to this determinism objection to causation.
3.1 Perspectivalism
Huw Price (1992, 1996, unpublished) tries to avoid it by ensuring that the global per-
spective is in fact metaphysically no more primary than the local perspective. We are
human agents trying to make our way in the world. As such, we have to take a per-
spective on reality that reflects our status as agents with goals and projects and the
capability of bringing some of those about. Our concepts reflect this goal-directedness
and our consequent interest in effective strategies. When we say that a relation of par-
tial determination holds between events, we are asserting something that depends on
our perspective. Firstly the limited and local nature of the relation depends on our be-
ing at best locally efficacious in our performance. We are at best partially in control of
the circumstances of our activity.
We also believe that performing a certain action leads to a certain goal in a way
that does not hold in reverse. This asymmetry of agency grounds all other causal asym-
metries. Where agents are not involved in a situation, still some counterfactual claims
(about what kinds of capacities agents would have had to make changes were agents
making a difference in that situation) hold true that ground the broader causal asym-
metry.
We can posit some other perspective, some other family of concepts, that will ab-
stract away from the logical dependence of our concepts on our limited purview. But
we can’t make the mistake of thinking that other family of concepts will replace ours,
or that they will legitimate ours. Ours are legitimated by our practices and are valid
within the framework of those practices. The other family of concepts, the determin-
ism or time symmetry of fundamental physics are another perspective. These practices
might not validate the concept of causation, but perhaps no further perspective can
adjudicate on the relative merits of these families of concepts, except as they are ap-
propriate or inappropriate for various tasks.
Perhaps, however, we might feel uncomfortable with relying solely on the prag-
matic necessities of our own agency to support the concept of causation. One might
feel that this kind of perspective-relative account is perfectly compatible with there be-
ing no genuine metaphysical relation of causation. The kind of epistemic or internal
realism about causation might not satisfy some of us, and we may wonder whether
there are other options available.
In particular, there is a thought that if higher level theories provide genuine expla-
nations and make reliable predictions and require a theoretical notion of causation that
has the content of the concept I sketched above, that might be enough to thwart the
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eliminativist argument. I explore how this might go below.
3.2 Empiricism
I think a kind of empiricist agnosticism about theoretical content might motivate a
refusal to take the underlying determinism as the last word. Empiricists believe that the
primary determinant of the acceptance of some claim is the empirical consequences of
that claim. For purely empirical claims about observable macroscopic objects and their
properties, this is fine. But what about claims that are partially or wholly non-empirical
in their content: highly theoretical claims, or claims about the theoretical properties of
observable entities?
Empiricists of old were quick to condemn such claims as meaningless, content
only to accept mutilated ‘translations’ of the theoretical content into a purely empiri-
cal content. This project foundered for many reasons, not least of which was that the
lack of clear demarcation condition between the empirical and theoretical rendered the
project a non-starter. Since van Fraassen (1980) there has been an empiricist project
that doesn’t self destruct before getting started. According to van Fraassen, the line
between empirical and non-empirical is not a line demarcating meaningfulness or con-
tentfulness, but rather epistemic coerciveness. The empirical content of a theory is
those claims that we are compelled to accept given the evidence we have; the theoreti-
cal content, while meaningful, doesn’t have this kind of compulsive force.
If this is right, then empiricists are compelled to accept theories that are empirically
adequate, but if two or more theories satisfy this constraint, the empiricist is not com-
pelled to accept any of them. Of course, given her tastes or requirements, the empiricist
can accept the further claims of any of these theories. In particular, the empiricist is
perfectly within her rights to use the theoretical component of a theory to make predic-
tions, provide explanations, and unify diverse realms of empirical data—to satisfy ‘the
aims of science’.
Theoretical content is essential for these tasks—another reason why the mutilation
project of the old empiricists failed to capture scientific practice. Theories are not only
pragmatically essential for explanation and prediction, but they provide resources for
explanation and prediction that pure empirical evidence cannot provide. In particular,
they provide modal resources. The crucial tasks of prediction and explanation are ir-
reducibly linked with concerns about what might happen, and with making what did
happen seem understandable and plausible in contrast with what did not happen. In
particular for our concerns, the modal relation of causation is important. Why did e
occur?—because c occurred. Whether or not Lewis is right when he says “to explain
an event is to provide some information about its causal history”13, it remains true
that causal explanations are a particularly important kind of explanation. They provide
13Lewis (1986a, 217).
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information about the modal variability of actual patterns of occurrence of particular
events, showing those events to be probable or plausible, able to be readily accommo-
dated into our familiar world view.14
Since we must have theoretical content to satisfy the aims of science, what should
dictate the theories we accept? For the empiricist, that has to be a pragmatic matter, de-
pending on the particular tasks of prediction and explanation that we have to perform.
I think it’s prima facie clear that greater inclusiveness of a theory doesn’t always in-
crease its pragmatic acceptability. Narrow theories can make more specific claims, and
hence retain more ceteris paribus content , hence yield more robust laws, and provide
more explanatory power.
The greater inclusiveness of ‘fundamental physics’ is therefore not in itself a rea-
son to accept it for all theoretical purposes. Less ambitious theories, like statistical
mechanics, or genetics, might well do better in their more limited domains, and as long
as they remain empirically adequate the methodologist cannot fault them. They are
of course incompatible in some respects with some broader theories like fundamental
physics. But incompatibility is a symmetric relation, so that can’t be used to fault the
less broad theories. Incompatibility is not a desirable feature to attribute to the world,
but the epistemic attitude that the empiricist counsels thankfully never has to force us
to take a committed attitude to the theoretical content of our theories.
So the empiricist might not be compelled to disbelieve in causation because she
doesn’t believe fundamental physics. Nevertheless, to move from this position of un-
derdetermined epistemic neutrality to a belief in causation is deeply at odds with the
empiricist prerogative of withholding assent. Unless we are to countenance some ex-
tremely weird claims of radical ontological indeterminacy, it must remain perfectly
possible for the empiricist that causation might be acceptable and false, though per-
haps we could never know it.
3.3 Modal Autonomy
To preserve causation as a genuine relation, despite what fundamental physics tells us,
it is not necessary to abandon realism or retreat to a purely epistemic causal relation. I
propose instead we be realist about relations between events in higher level or coarse-
grained theories, especially if those relations or events have a different modal profile to
the fine-grained relations or events at a lower level of description.
Sometimes the modal profiles of events in the special sciences are radically differ-
ent from their profiles in fundamental physics. The possibility of multiple realisability
14A concern raised by Huw Price is that if explanation involves causation, then appealing to explana-
tory power to support the existence of causation is going to be circular or question-begging. But consider
comparing how well a theory which uses causal explanations satisfies the aims of science with how well a
theory which does not. If the former does better, then causation helps satisfy the aims of science, and hence
is legitimately introduced on that ground.
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(or its converse) is one thing I’m thinking of here. Consider if microphysical reduction
were to hold. Then event e really is some microphysical em, and since em couldn’t
have failed to be self-identical, the claim of identity between e and em must be contin-
gent since e could have been composed otherwise.
The objection that ‘really’ this couldn’t have been otherwise is odd. It is like mak-
ing the objection that it couldn’t have been the case that p, since the actual truth pre-
cludes p. Of course in some sense it couldn’t have been the case that p, because then
it would have been the case that p and ¬p. But that isn’t the modal claim in question.
I think the coarse-grained events of the special sciences have a claim to a kind of
modal autonomy. Insofar as they provide additional modal truths, and insofar as ex-
planatory and predictive power comes along with modal resources on my view, these
theories are capable of providing explanations and predictions that the underlying mi-
crophysics is not capable of providing.
If, as I argued above, causation is a relation between events as they are subsumed
under some generic variable, then this will be particularly powerful. Causal explana-
tions are useful precisely because they provide the modal conditions which make the
actual course of affairs an expected or comprehensible instance of a particular pattern
of event dependence. But the actual course of affairs doesn’t have this modal profile:
it went the way it went and couldn’t have gone another way, and in that sense is no
more or less comprehensible than any other particular set of events. It is only with
the resources of a particular coarse-graining or partitioning of the event space that we
can have non-trivial modal claims and hence non-trivial claims about why that pattern
occurred the way it did, rather than some other pattern.
This holds for macroscopic properties more generally. The argument is quite inde-
pendent of other, more pragmatic claims about macroscopic properties—for example,
that they provide convenient summaries of the microscopic data, that idealising and
discretising the world makes it manageable, and so on. I think this modal robustness
of the special sciences, in the face of the stubborn fragility of microphysics, provides a
genuine increase in our explanatory and predictive powers. This makes it constitution-
ally better able to deal with satisfying some of the aims of science.
In a sense, I think that the Russellian objection involves conflating general and
particular causation. The sense is that really what happens in each particular case
is some microphysical stuff, and that since fixing that actually determines all other
microphysical facts, there is no sense to the claim that some variables can be held
fixed while others are varied. I can agree to that, and still claim that coarse graining
that microphysical stuff different ways can lead to different explanatory and predictive
abilities, each of which is perfectly objective with respect to the coarse-graining of
the event in question, and each of which perfectly correctly applies to the situation in
question in virtue of the obtaining of an event in their event space.
Moreover, I don’t think that just because a single event can fall under many coarse
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grained descriptions that somehow those descriptions can’t all capture features of that
event. Though my age and gender are in a sense determined just by me now, the
particular precise individual, that doesn’t mean that I’m not correctly classed as having
quite different modal properties in virtue of those classifications, or that those modal
properties conflict.
One might object that this is not entirely dissimilar to the perspectivalism of §3.1. I
think there are important similarities, and I would be happy to retreat to a perspectival
view were the modal autonomy proposal to fail. But I do think that causation is a
genuine and real relation between coarse grained events, obtaining just when some
particular description of the space of possible events is true, and equally objective and
independent as that space it. It is not obvious to me that the perspectival approach can
make this robustly realist claim.
One final option merits discussion; it was suggested to me by Chris Hitchcock.
We can grant Russell that physics is deterministic. But sometimes we are interested
in dealing with quasi-isolated systems, and for them we have developed an elaborate
framework of structural equations and graphical causal models. This framework pro-
vides results which work, the approach is clearly a mature science. Thus a mature
science which is well-confirmed and genuinely explanatory dictates that we should use
the notion of a cause. Whether or not determinism reigns, for the kind of system in
question this approach is the best we have. Now, it just so happens that around here,
quasi-isolated systems are instantiated by deterministic systems. But that doesn’t mean
that there is no possibility that they might not be; nor does that impugn the fact that
approaching these deterministic systems in this way is methodologically sounder than
the alternative reductionist approach.
4 Conclusion
I think that we should resist the Russellian conclusion. Insofar as we need to put
constraints on our notion of causation, we have seen that it does not have a natural
home in a deterministic global microphysics.
But the concept can be naturally reconstructed in in contexts where the events we
deal with are local and epistemically convenient. Indeed, in such contexts it has prag-
matic and constitutional advantages over the reductionist aspirations of fundamental
physics.
Am I a realist about causation? I think that, given the context, the counterfactual
dependence relations between the events of that context genuinely obtain. Am I a
realist about particular fine-grained causation then? Possibly not.
Draft of 23 July, 2003.
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